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ABSTRACT

If murder mysteries are to carry an epistemic force, it is important to examine how murder mysteries represent a unique way of knowing, of coming to view the world, for their readers. This can be accomplished by looking at the text of murder mysteries and how the nature of the text influences the reality creating process; by exploring the nature of the "solver" of the mystery and how readers find some identification with the characters in the mysteries; and by looking at how these factors of mystery-as-epistemic allow audiences to create a universal understanding of how murder happens, is investigated, and is solved. Murder mysteries have the force to create reality. They force upon the reader a way of knowing, of apprehending what occurs in criminal investigations. The interpretation and creation of the text by some readers may often tend to create a special, distinctive universe for the interpreters of the text. Murder mysteries present a closed text, unchanging in its inscription, giving modern readers a sense of closure all too rare in their lives. (Twenty notes are included.) (RS)

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HERCULE POIROT V. REALITY:
MURDER MYSTERIES AS AN EPISTEMIC FORCE

by

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On Monday, October 23, a pregnant Massachusetts attorney was brutally murdered by a gunshot wound to the head. Two and a half weeks later, her infant son, delivered by Caesarian section, also died. And this murder of Carol Stuart shocked and appalled much of the nation. It was a murder bound to catch national attention -- a white, suburban woman killed in cold blood by an unidentified black man. An area manhunt was launched; rewards were offered; scholarships to the victim's alma mater were established; and Boston-area residents demanded that the murderer be caught.

But nearly every week, not far from where Carol Stuart was shot, black men and women lose their lives. They are poor, often unmourned, with "useless" lives (according to the professionals who are our decision makers or news gatekeepers), and their passing, while sometimes noted, rarely stirs the kind of anger which Carol Stuart's death engendered.

In many ways, Carol Stuart's murder could have been the stuff of novels or dramas. A young, successful, professional woman, who was brutally murdered in the seventh month of her first pregnancy; a city and, indeed, a nation outraged over the crime; demands that the police solve the murder -- this sounds like the plot of "Cagney and Lacey" or "Hill Street Blues."

Typically, modern Americans' real, first-hand view of murder is through the mass media. Violent death is shown us every day in television news; it is explained for us in newspapers and magazines. But murder only *means* for us when we can understand the people involved -- when we can see their pain and grief, can identify with the victims and can imagine ourselves in their place. Such identification most frequently occurs when the crimes, and their solutions, are fictionalized for us. I, a university professor, scholar, and sometime consultant, can feel a kind

of universal grief at the passing of a poor black woman or man; but my grief is only a surface grief. My understanding is limited by my identification with the victim. The stronger my identification, the more intense my emotional and psychological reaction to violent death.

In this way, I am often more affected by fictional deaths than by real ones. Often, in fiction, the victims are more like me -- they have professional responsibilities; they have families and personal associations; they have some future which has been brutally wrenched from them. When a college professor is murdered by a colleague in an Agatha Christie story, it is more "real" for me than if a poor, welfare mother is stabbed by hoodlums.

Even beyond identification with the victims, however, is a kind of sure belief that real-life murder must be similar to fictional murder. In fictional murder, there is a hero (sleuth) who tracks down the villain (murderer). There is always a clear reason (motive) for the crime -- a motive which we can, in part, understand. The villain is always punished (either by law, which is usual/typical, or by circumstance, or even by the hero). And when the wrong man or woman is accused of a crime, the crime gets solved and the innocent freed, even if closing arguments have begun.

Fictional crime stories tend to create a reality for their readers or viewers in which crimes are committed for identifiable or discernible reasons, are examined "logically" or "scientifically," and are solved with dispatch -- usually in about 200 pages or an hour.

Our discipline has maintained that literature has a clear rhetorical component -- that literature can persuade and help to alter our view of self and the world. Literary works, as a vehicle for rhetorical argument, must be considered when embracing a modern, non-speech-exclusive, definition of rhetoric. Indeed, much of what we now know as or believe to be rhetoric is conveyed to us through fiction -- in television, on the silver screen, or in literature.

It is, therefore, useful to look at the literary/fictional genre of "murder mysteries" both in its rhetorical guise and as a strong epistemic force -- a way of knowing and apprehending the world. Such murder mysteries, at least in this examination, are different from "police stories." One is loathe to include the police as our protagonists, since they are the ones who are supposed

to, but rarely do, solve the crime. Classic murder mysteries are solved by people other than the police -- everybody knows that!

In so far as such fictionalizations intrude on how we apprehend reality, and especially reality related to violent crime, they are surely rhetorical artifacts. We must explore, here, not the *ontic* aspect of the murder mystery (that which is known, an object of study, its "thing-ness"); rather, it is important to look at the *epistemic* (or reality apprehension and creation) component of this genre. We must see with the eye of Robert L. Scott, who asserts that "In human affairs, then, rhetoric . . . is a way of knowing; it is epistemic."[1]

If we are to apprehend the murder mystery as an epistemic force, it is important for us to examine how murder mysteries are an unique way of knowing, of coming to view the world, for their readers. I propose to do this in several ways: First, I will look to the *text* of murder mysteries, and how the nature of *text* influences the reality-creation process. Second, it is important to explore the *"solver"* of the mystery -- usually the protagonist -- and how readers, in Burkean terms, find some *identification*[2] with characters in murder mysteries, particularly as regards the motivation intrinsic to their rhetorical component. Finally, we can look at how these factors of mystery-as-epistemic allow audiences to create a universal understanding of how murder happens, is investigated, and is solved.

HERMENEUTIC TEXT

Hermeneutics may be best defined in John B. Thompson's terms as "a discipline that has been primarily concerned with the elucidation of rules for the interpretation of text."[3] Much of hermeneutics is devoted to understanding text (historic, literary, or otherwise), but the works of Paul Ricoeur provide the most readily understood and insightful definition of the facets of hermeneutic text.[4]

"Text" in Ricoeur's hermeneutics is divorced from the speech act in that

> . . . the text is not merely the inscription of some anterior speech, since speaking and writing are alternative and equally fundamental models of the realisation of discourse. Nevertheless, the realisation of discourse under the condition of inscription displays a series of characteristics which effectively distance the text from the circumstances of speech.[5]

In this way, literature is "distanced" from oral interaction. This distanciation process indicates several changes in the focus of written text as opposed to oral congress. Ricoeur notes that

> the literary work discloses a world only under the condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is suspended. [Or in other words: in the literary work, discourse unfolds its denotation as a denotation of the second order, in virtue of suspension of the denotation of the first order.][6]

This second-orderness of text is manifest most readily in several forms of distanciation which remove it from the rules governing traditional oral discourse (either rhetorical or dialogic). The literary text, claims Ricoeur, contains altered concepts of meaning, author, audience, and ostensive reference: four pivotal distanciations from the speech act, giving literary text a different ontological and epistemological universe from which to function.

Meaning. The first major distanciation comes in how a text "means" in ways different from an initial speech act. The inscription is, therefore, "the surpassing of the event of saying by the meaning of what is said."[7] Thompson elucidates Ricoeur's first form of distanciation further, noting:

> For it is the meaning which is inscribed in writing, and this inscription is rendered possible by the 'intentional exteriorisation' of the speech act.[8]

In short, inscription allows for reflection; indeed, it requires that a reflective act be performed. This, claims Ricoeur, is necessary for meaning to manifest. Meaning is never an *a priori*.

Author. The second form of distanciation for Ricoeur is in the idea of author/speaker/sender. In oral discourse, authorial/speaker intent and the meaning of what is

said are difficult, if not impossible, to separate, and often overlap. In the case of writing, however,

> the text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author.[9]

Put more simply, text moves immediately away from author once inscribed. It is unnecessary and even harmful to focus merely on the author of a literary text because, by doing so, the meaning of the text is obscured. There is an obvious sense in which the I that is typing even this passage of this essay is not the same I that wrote the preceding sections. This text comes to mean beyond me and in spite of me.

Further, the distanciation of author from text proves the futility of attempts to analyze authorial intent. Moreover, when text is rhetorical in nature, the rhetorical impetus may be said to arise, not from the author, but from the text itself. That is, in so far as a murder mystery is read by its audience, it is the text which has epistemic force; the text embodies not just message, in a rhetorical sense, but also sender. In a sense, author does not constitute text; rather, text tends to constitute author! The text remains, despite its historicity, as a complete entity, while the author does not do so.

The distanciation of ***audience*** functions in a similar fashion, in that the audience of spoken discourse is specified in advance by the dialogical situation. "In the case of writing the text is addressed to an unknown audience and potentially to anyone who is able to read."[10] The text, then, is not locked into a specific socio-historical context; it is open to limitless interpretations in any number of spatial or temporal contexts.

As Umberto Eco has noted,

> The 'civilization' of the modern novel offers a story in which the reader's main interest is transferred to the unpredictable nature of *what will happen* and, therefore, to the plot invention which now holds our attention. The event has not happened *before* the story; it happens *while* it is being told, and usually even the author does not know what will take place.[11]

Thus, the knowledge of the plot is not the essence of the literary experience. Rather, the creation of the text in a fresh, new fashion by each new reader provides the true experiencing of the murder mystery. It is not enough to know, for instance, that in "The Red-Headed Man" the title character is merely a dupe, and his new "task" simply a way to get him away from his store in order that others may rob an adjoining bank. Instead, each reading is a fresh experiencing of literary text in completely new ways -- even if text is an old, comfortable friend.

Ricoeur's final distanciation, that of *ostensive references*, removes restrictions based on the dialogic situation. The text is then not situation-specific in its references, but rather is free for interpretation by whatever means its readers choose to use. There is no pointing to "this ball" or "that child," since such references have no meaning without the specific ball or child referred to. Rather, an inscribed text may refer to the ball or the child -- and it is the interpreter's interpretation which then gives meaning to the reference.

What this all boils down to is quite simple: every interpretation of text is new and based on the interpreter. A text is itself: it is not its author, its initial audi[redacted]ntext, or even its composition. A text does not have meaning a priori, but only condition[redacted] the interpretive act. Umberto Eco perhaps sums up this argument best:

> A work of art, therefore, is a complete and *closed* form in its uniqueness as a balanced organic whole, while at the same time constituting an *open* product on account of its susceptibility to countless different interpretations which do not impinge on its unalterable specificity. Hence every reception of a work of art is both an *interpretation*

> and a *performance* of it, because in every reception the work takes on a fresh perspective for itself.[12]

Eco further contends that the variety and versatility of possible interpretations are necessary and healthy to the interpretive process: that they inject vitality into a work of art and to the appreciation of that work. Further, such interpretation is creation in that the work is created anew with each new appreciation of it.

To some, the writings of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle might have been old hat, but my first reading of them brought me into a world lightheaded with logical deductions. My belief about who Sherlock Holmes was (and is, in that he lives each time the text is apprehended) is perfectly valid, based upon what the text says to me. Not only does Sherlock Holmes live afresh each time someone discovers him, but he is created in different and interesting ways by each reader.

Thus, an understanding of hermeneutic text unfolds for us a realization that: (1) text is distanced from, and therefore different from, spoken discourse; (2) text may *mean* outside of any given socio-historic context, and may therefore be read anew by individual audiences in different socio-historic contexts; (3) text is not merely newly *interpreted* by each reading, but is also newly *created* by those readings; and (4) text has meaning and epistemic force in and of itself, and not because of its ties to any given author. In a very real sense, text is author.

SOLVER/CHANGE AGENT IN MURDER MYSTERIES

Umberto Eco has noted of literary heroes a difference, clear and definable, in different types of literary work. In "The Myth of Superman," for instance, he examines Superman as constituted by and developed by the D.C. Comics comic books. He notes that some heroes, as, for instance, Superman, find themselves "in this singular situation: he must be an archetype, the

totality of certain collective aspirations, and therefore he must necessarily become immobilized in an emblematic and fixed nature which renders him easily recognizable. . ."[13] This archetypal nature, contends Eco, is not present to any noticeable degree in the characters of novels. As Eco contends:

> The mythic character embodies a law, or a universal demand, and therefore must be in part *predictable* and cannot hold surprises for us; the character of a novel wants, rather, to be a man like anyone else, and what could befall him is as unforeseeable as what may happen to us. Such a character will take on what we will call an 'aesthetic universality,' a capacity to serve as a reference point for behavior and feelings which belong to us all. He does not contain the universality of myth, nor does he become an archetype, the emblem of a supernatural reality. He is the result of a universal rendering of a particular and eternal event. The character of a novel is a 'historic type.'[14]

The novel, then, Eco contends, must adopt as its pivotal character one with whom the reader/audience of text may, to some extent, identify. It is important for the reader/audience to understand that the "solver" of the murder is not god-like or archetypal.

In many ways, the solver of a murder is a lot like we are -- only more so. Sherlock Holmes is just a little more analytical; Hercule Poirot, Agatha Christie's famous Belgian sleuth, is just a bit better at judging the human psychology with his "little gray cells"; Miss Marpole is more world-wise about what people will do; Sir Peter Whimsey, Dorothy L. Sayers' disaffected nobleman-playboy, is just a bit better at asking questions. They are us in many ways. Of the four, only Miss Marpole lacks the "fatal flaw" which allows us a small feeling of superiority -- except that she is a little, old, vestal virgin of Victorian breed who never really had anything of a love life -- one point for us.

Holmes, Poirot, Marpole and Whimsey are all, to some extent, identifiable because they are "consumptive" characters in Eco's sense -- all are human, all consumed by the human condition. All refer to a past which is somewhat immediate, unlike Eco's Superman, whose past

is never particularly crystalized for us. More, they have flaws: Holmes is truly consumed by his use of drugs; Poirot is a hypochondriac with clear, fatal vanity; and Whimsey is like his name -- his moods whimsically unpredictable and, seemingly, doomed to misery. (Ms. Sayers finally takes pity on her creation and allows him to marry, but even his honeymoon is plagued by dratted corpses.)

Moreover, Eco notes, novels' characters are subject to temporal consumption -- they are allowed to grow old. In murder mysteries, particularly mysteries with the same "solver," protagonists have a past which we, the re-creators, are permitted to see. There is a causality to their insight; their talents, while above average, have a history. Citing Reichenbach, Eco notes that time is

> the order of causes, the order of open causal chains which we see verified in our universe and the direction of time in terms of growing entropy (taking up in terms even of information theory the thermodynamic concept which had recurrently interested philosophers and which they adopted as their own in speaking of the irreversibility of time).[15]

In murder mysteries, especially in some of the classic series' progressions, we see the temporal order. We are occasionally plagued by "prequels," those books written to fill holes in time which the extant texts have not explained in depth. But, by and large, we see the characters developing, getting older, changing in depth and scope. This temporal consumption, notes Eco, is that which flesh is heir to, and it makes, for us, believable, identifiable characters in the text.[16]

Usually, we are permitted to see the "solver" in the process of ferreting out the guilty party. Whether it is Sam Spade, searching for the Maltese Falcon, or Sherlock Holmes unravelling the mystery of the Hound of the Baskervilles, we watch them, live with them, see their solving process. But we quickly realize that there are things to which we are not privy. Rarely are we shown the whole picture -- the text shows us one view, tells us one part, of what

we need to know. Only at the end, when Ellery Queen gathers all of the suspects together to discuss or re-enact the crime, do we become fully aware of what we have missed.

We know that they will solve the crime; we are part of that solution as we create the text and interact with it in very intense ways. There is a unity in conflict, as Kenneth Burke has noted:

> And so, in the end, men are brought to that most tragically ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single destructive act. We refer to that ultimate disease of cooperation: war.[17]

While Burke notes that war is a kind of prototypic cooperation to destroy, the same can be said of some crimes which our protagonists must solve. In the classic Christie Murder on the Orient Express, Poirot, in another kind of cooperative identification with the text's reader, unfolds the cooperative murder by all of the suspects, rather than a single one.

We see, then, several things about the protagonist in murder mysteries: (1) s/he is usually superior in intellect and reasoning, or in raw psychological understanding, to the norm (even when the protagonist is one we might not normally consider "bright" in the sense of intellect, there is a kind of identifiable cunning); (2) s/he is usually somehow flawed, in ways which we can understand, and, hence, human (often more human than the reader/audience); and (3) two types of cooperative identification seem to occur vis-a-vis the plot: (a) the cooperation within the text, either with the protagonist or between antagonists, and (b) the cooperation between the reader/audience and the protagonist, which enable the reader/audience to more clearly apprehend the text and the protagonist's investigation.

The intrinsic "mystery" of the novel -- who killed whom -- is further enhanced by another form of mystery exclusive to the protagonist. Often, the sleuth, while somewhat identifiable, is distanced from the reader and made more mysterious by inherent differences. Burke explains:

> Similarly, the conditions for 'mystery' are set by *any* pronounced social distinctions, as between nobility and commoners, courtiers and king, leader and people, rich and poor,

> judge and prisoner at the bar, 'superior race' and underprivileged 'races' or minorities. Thus even the story of relations between the petty clerk and the office manager, however realistically told, draws upon the wells of mystery for its appeal, since the social distinction between clerk and manager makes them subtly mysterious to each other, not merely two different people, but representing two different *classes* (or 'kinds') of people. The clerk and the manager are identified with and by different social principles.[18]

Burke expands the idea of inherent mystery to express the clear mystery of the sexes, which is also frequently used to enhance the mystery of the murder -- as illustrated by the frequency with which "love" or "hate" are seen as motives for murder.

Like sub-plots, then, the mysteries within mysteries abound: the nobleman who dabbles in sleuthing out murderers; the intellectual who out-wits criminals, and often takes only the most intellectually stimulating of cases; the rich "playboy" for whom solving murders is "fun" in an otherwise drab existence; or the blood-and-guts detective whose background is obscured, but whose early pain gives him/her a kind of animal cunning and, often, sexual attraction.

We find such mysteries stimulating, exciting, and wholly engrossing, causing us even more interaction with the text and even more depth in our creation of it. The sub-text of human interaction is often what Burke calls the "mystification in the social order."[20] Even more mystifying, from the reader's perspective, is why these sleuths sleuth. The murder mystery, then, is not created of a single, or a series of related, mysteries about corpses. That is the easiest mystery. It is the protagonist who provides us with the most mystification -- who s/he is, why s/he sleuths, how his/her mind works: these are the things we do not understand. It is our search for motive -- not just of the criminal, but also of the sleuth -- which rivets us to such stories.

In a rhetorical sense, much of our fascination with the classic sleuths (for we seem much more intrigued by who they are and how they do what they do than we are with the actual murder which they explicate) is due both the differences and similarities which we perceive between ourselves and the protagonists. In so far as the text which we perceive and create is

embodied in the protagonist, we find some points of identification -- the "commonplaces" of which Aristotle spoke. Burke notes of Aristotle's commonplaces:

> Aristotle reviews the purposes, acts, things, conditions, states of mind, personal characteristics, and the like, which people consider promising or formidable, good or evil, useful or dangerous, admirable or loathsome, and so on.[20]

It is upon commonplaces which texts of murder mysteries are, in large part, based. The most obvious shared belief is that murder is wrong, bad, evil, or in violation of Western ideology that human life is to be preserved and that the unwarranted taking of it is to be punished. (Although not even this principle is always an *a priori* in all murder mysteries. In Murder on the Orient Express, for instance, the reader/audience finds itself in sympathy with the group-murder which has taken place, and a kind of cognitive dissonance ensues.) This commonplace allows us to create even stronger identification with the sleuth, in that s/he is ferreting out a murderer -- something which most readers of mysteries believe is a noteworthy action.

It is clear, then, that "classic" murder mysteries generally create powerful protagonists. It is not the murder which is unique or special -- corpses are, after all, corpses, say the mystery readers. Certainly, one admits, there are times where the circumstances of the murders are particularly ghastly or fascinatingly impossible (although Occam's Razor usually manages to shave that problem fairly neatly). Of course, the murder is important. Yes, we are shocked at the murder, particularly when a well-crafted mystery chooses to show us a corpse we didn't expect.

But murder, after all, is *why* the story is, not *what* it is. What murder mysteries do more than give us some idea of how to solve crime is to give us faith that there are others who *can* solve crime. In this sense, and in the sense that the text of murder mysteries is at one and the same time open and closed, such literature tends to be epistemic.

MURDER MYSTERIES AS EPISTEMIC

After the slaying of Carol Stuart in Boston nearly a month ago, my Free Speech Law class was discussing the murder. "Why," they asked, helpless and frustrated, "haven't they caught the man yet?" They were not alone in asking that question. Every day, someone else asks "why haven't they solved that murder," and every day, the same response sticks in my mind: "This isn't fiction."

As our society reads, views, and listens to murder mysteries, several common factors in how those mysteries are presented emerge:

1. There is always a reason. Murder has to have a reason, and it should be one we can understand. We are so used to identifying with murderers through the commonplaces we share that we have to look for a motive. We can understand murder for money, or love, or revenge. But we cannot understand "sense-less" killings. It is as if we believe what Agatha Christie's Hercule Poirot once maintained: that in each of us there is the capacity to do murder.
2. There is always a powerful sleuth who will solve the crime. At the risk of sounding facetious, we expect Dudly Dooright to come riding over the hill proclaiming "I always get my man." Murderers get caught, right? In all of the movies, they get caught. In all of the books, they get caught. Why don't they always get caught in real life?
3. Murder investigations should not take a long time. After all, the murderer is always caught by the end of "Murder, She Wrote," and that's only an hour. Or the murderer is caught at the end of the book, and that is only a couple of hundred pages or so.
4. Murderers should get convicted of murder. We still don't understand plea bargaining. And murder mysteries do not give us any real insight into whether murderers will be convicted. The mystery ends when the murderer is caught.

5. Murderers should just confess and get it over with. After all, Perry Mason exacts confessions in each book. Hercule Poirot manages to get the murderer to do something stupid to give him/herself away. And Sherlock Holmes always has incontrovertable evidence -- forcing murderers to own up to their crimes.

Clearly these murder mysteries shape our reality. They show us how murder investigations should unfold; they tell us where to look for those who commit crimes; they force us to look for salvation from those who solve crimes; and they help to frustrate it when things don't go as well as they [redacted].

A colleague who teaches a course in criminalistics told me that her students were incredibly disturbed to hear that police at the scene of a crime often don't put things into plastic bags (since the condensation would destroy finger prints); that sometimes the police don't need help from amateur sleuths; that police are often openly hostile at efforts to interfere with on-going murder investigations.

Our lack of faith in the police to solve crimes may also be tied to murder mysteries and their insidious epistemic force. We know that it really is not the police who solve these murders, and we have a view that they cannot. At the same time, we have no real Sherlock Holmes, no J.B. Fletcher who will solve them for us. And our frustration, at this lack of a *deux ex machina*, is increased even over what it was already.

Do murder mysteries have the force to create reality? Yes, I believe they do. They certainly force upon us a way of knowing, of apprehending what occurs in criminal investigations. More, the interpretation and creation of the text which some do may often tend to create a special, distinctive universe for the interpreters of the text. The very existence of Sherlock Holmes appreciation groups like the "Baker Street Irregulars" (named for urchins that once helped the noted sleuth) is a case in point.

Finally, in so far as the text of murder mysteries is a closed text, unchanging in its inscription and, to some extent, inevitable in outcome, it provides for us a nice, neat package. It

gives the modern reader a sense of closure all too rare in our own lives -- where good guys still catch bad guys, and the bad guys are punished.

Endnotes

[1]Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal*, 18 (Feb. 1967), pp. 9-17.

[2]Several aspects of this concept are fully explicated in Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd), 1969.

[3]John B. Thompson, *Critical Hermeneutics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 36.

[4]Although the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have also been associated with phenomenology, semiotics, and critical theory, the "pure" form of hermeneutics has much older roots -- tracing its origins to the Greek Enlightenment.

[5]Thompson, p. 52.

[6]Paul Ricoeur, *Role of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, tr. Robert Czerny with Katherine McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 221.

[7]Thompson, p. 52.

[8]Thompson, p. 52.

[9]Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and tr. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 136.

[10]Thompson, p. 52.

[11]Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 109.

[12]Eco, p. 49.

[13]Eco, p. 110.

[14]Eco, p. 109

[15]Eco, p. 112.

[16]Eco, pp. 112-117

[17]Burke, p. 22.

[18]Burke, p. 115.

[19]Burke, p. 118.

[20]Burke, p. 20.